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Answering "The Call of the Wild":
An Examination of U.S. Participation in
International Wildlife Law
Gary D. Meyers*
Kyla Seligsohn Bennett**

The date may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have
been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.
The French have already discovered that the blackness of
the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor [see
Louis XIV's Code Noir]. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the
skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to
the same fate.'

Introduction
For a number of reasons - ethical, social, economic, and
biological - the protection of wildlife is a particularly appro* Adjunct Professor of Environmental Law, Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School of Law. J.D.; Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School of Law,
1982.
** J.D., Lewis and Clark College, Northwestern School of Law, 1989; Ph.D., University of Connecticut. Ms. Seligsohn Bennett began work as a Wetlands Enforcement Specialist for the Environmental Protection Agency, Region I, on March 1,
1990.
1. J. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
235-236 (1789), cited in, C.D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL
PLURALISM 34 (1987), to support the proposition that as human cultures mature,
rights are constantly expanded from a narrow segment of society to include new
members as rights holders and that there is no reason this expansion must be limited
to the human animal community.
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priate subject for international law and regulation. First, wildlife plays an important role on our planet and in the lives of
humans. Animals provide many people with food, labor,
clothes, protection, and companionship. Some animals, like
the leech, are valued for medicinal uses. Non-human animals
also provide scientists with insights into human behavior and
physiology.' Furthermore, the preservation of genetic diversity is fast becoming a goal of many nations.3 Not only is the
presence of wildlife an indicator of global health, but there is
a strong relationship between diversity of species and ecological stability.' Second, many species of wildlife migrate across
human geographic boundaries. Thus, one country's use of a
species can adversely affect another country's use and enjoyment of the same species. Finally, there is significant international economic interest in wildlife. For example, in 1980 the
United States imported close to one billion dollars worth of
wildlife and wildlife products.5 Unfortunately, this high-volume trade endangers the survival of many species. When live
wildlife is transported for distribution to pet stores and zoos,
an estimated ninety percent does not survive the trip.7 It is
also estimated that millions of species will become extinct in
the coming decades because of the combined effects of habitat
destruction and trade.'
This article surveys the international wildlife laws and
treaties that are in force today. In Part I, the various approaches used to regulate the taking, use, and protection of
2. See, e.g., E.O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY (1978).
3. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
FUTURE

147 (1987) [hereinafter

OUR COMMON FUTURE],

DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON

in which the authors note that

conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitat is crucial for development in the Third
World, and note further that this conservation is on the agenda of many
governments.
4. Schonfeld, InternationalTrade in Wildlife: How Effective is the Endangered
Species Treaty?, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 114-15 (1985).
5. Melak, Regulation of International Trade in Endangered Wildlife, 1 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 249, 252 (1982).
6. Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 112.
7. Melak, supra note 5, at 253.
8. Comment, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species:
No Carrot,But Where's the Stick?, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10222, 10222-23 (1987). "
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wildlife are examined. The problems associated with the individual treaty approaches are also discussed. In Part II, general
solutions to the wildlife protection dilemma are considered, as
are recommendations for strengthening particular treaties.
The discussion is limited to treaties and conventions to which
the United States is a party. Furthermore, treaties and conventions relating solely to fish are not discussed due to the
considerable number of them in existence9 and because other
authors have addressed this vast topic in great depth."°
9. Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, T.I.A.S. No.
6767, 673 U.N.T.S. 63; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 599
U.N.T.S. 285; Amended Agreement for the Establishment of an Indo-Pacific Fisheries
Council, Nov. 23, 1961, 13 U.S.T. 2511, T.I.A.S. No. 5218, 418 U.N.T.S. 348; Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31,
1949, 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention for the
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 381, T.I.A.S.
No. 2786; Amendment to the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean, April 25, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1095, T.I.A.S. No. 9242; Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic, March 2, 1982, T.I.A.S.
No. 10789; Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Sept.
22, 1983, United States-Bulgaria, T.I.A.S. No. 10816; Agreement adopting, with certain modifications, the rules and methods of procedure recommended in the award of
September 7, 1910, of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, July 20, 1912,
United States-United Kingdom, 37 Stat. 1634, T.S. No. 572; Convention for the Extension to Halibut Fishing Vessels of Port Privileges on the Pacific Coasts of the
United States of America and Canada, March 24, 1950, United States-Canada, 1
U.S.T. 356, T.I.A.S. No. 2096; Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery
of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, March 2, 1953, United States-Canada,
5 U.S.T.' 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900; Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10, 1954,
United States-Canada, 6 U.S.T. 2836, T.I.A.S. No. 3326; Amendment to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, April 5 and May 19, 1967, United States-Canada, 18
U.S.T. 1402, T.I.A.S. No. 6297; Agreement Concerning Fishing Off the West Coast of
Canada, March 29, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 4067, T.I.A.S. No. 9448; Agreement Concerning
Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, April 13, 1983, United States-German
Democratic Republic,
- U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10687; Agreement Concerning
Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, July 26, 1982, United States-Republic
of Korea, U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10571; Convention Regarding Navigation,
Fishing, and Trading on the Pacific Ocean and Along the Northwest Coast of
America, April 17, 1824, United States-USSR, 8 Stat. 302, T.S. 298; Fisheries, Feb.
21, 1973, United States-USSR, 24 U.S.T. 1588, T.I.A.S. No. 7663; Fisheries, Feb. 26,
1975, United States-USSR, 26 U.S.T. 167, T.I.A.S. No. 8022; Fisheries Off the United
States Coasts, Nov. 26, 1976, United States-USSR, 28 U.S.T. 1847, T.I.A.S. No. 8528;
Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement, March 27, 1979, United States-United Kingdom,
U.S.T.
-, T.I.A.S. No. 10545.
10. See Nafziger, Global Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals,
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Part I
Most treaties and conventions can be classified into one
of two schemes: regulatory or prohibitory. Regulatory schemes
permit the taking of wildlife, but limit the numbers, sex, or
ages of animals that can be taken, or proscribe the times of
year that animals can be taken.11 Prohibitory schemes generally ban the taking of certain species, or ban the taking of
groups of animals living in a particular area.12 However, all
prohibitory schemes currently contain exceptions to the ban
on takings.13 These exceptions may seem narrow at first
glance, but often open the door to abuse.
Initially, this article examines those wildlife laws and
treaties that are purely regulatory, and then progresses to an
examination of those that are a combination of regulatory and
prohibitory schemes. Lastly, those laws and treaties that are
primarily prohibitory are discussed. In each instance, the effectiveness of the particular treaty is considered.
A.

Multilateral-Whaling Regulation

A number of conventions regulate whaling. For example,
the first convention, the Convention for the Regulation of
17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 591, 598 (1980); Comment, The Ghosts of Fishing Nets Past: A
Proposal for Regulating Derelict Synthetic Fishing Nets, 63 WASH. L. REv. 677
(1988); Jacobson, InternationalFisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L. REV, 1161
(1985); Evans, Toward the Return of Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 16 ENVTL. L. 359
(1986); Flory, Recent Development: Construing the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments: The D.C. Circuit Court Harpoons Executive Discretion, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 631 (1986); Jensen, The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception
Treaty: An Historical and Legal Overview, 16 ENvTL. L. 363 (1986); Comment, The
Exclusive Economic Zone: Its Development and Future in Internationaland Domestic Law, 45 LA. L. REV. 1269 (1985); Kalo, Water Pollution and Commercial Fishermen: Applying General Maritime Law to Claims for Damages to Fisheries in Ocean

and Coastal Waters, 61 N.C.L. REV. 313 (1983); McLean and Sucharitkul, Fisheries
Management and Development in the EEZ: The North, South, and Southwest Pacific Experience, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 492 (1988); Jones, Harvesting the Ocean's
Resources: Oil or Fish?, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 587 (1987).
11. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S.
No. 880, 155 L.N.T.S. 349 [hereinafter Multilateral-Whaling Regulation].
12. See, e.g., infra note 101, art. III.
13. See, e.g., Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972,
art. 4, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826 [hereinafter Antarctic Seal Convention].
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Whaling (Multilateral-Whaling Regulation), was ratified on
September 24, 1931.14 Although. the Multilateral-Whaling
Regulation is predominantly regulatory, articles four and five
are prohibitory. The primary objective of this Convention was
to insure the propagation of whales for the survival of the
whaling industry. Thus the Multilateral-Whaling Regulation
prohibits the taking of calves, suckling whales, immature
whales, and females accompanied by calves. 15 The Multilateral-Whaling Regulation mandates that waste of whale products be kept to a minimum by using all possible parts of the
carcasses.1 6 The regulations only apply to baleen whales, 1 7 but
the Convention also completely bans the taking of right
whales, including certain subspecies."
Right whales have been hunted since 800 to 1000 A.D. 9
They were named "right" whales because they swam close to
shore, swam relatively slowly, and floated when dead; thus,
they were the "right" whales to kill.2 0 Right whales float when
dead because of the extremely high oil content in their tissues.2 The ease with which they could be killed and the high
economic return from the whale oil exacerbated the decline of
the species, and today, only an estimated four thousand right
whales survive.2 2
The Multilateral-Whaling Regulation contains inherent
problems which render it ineffective. For example, there is little, if any, sexual dimorphism between male and female baleen whales,23 consequently, it is practically impossible for a
whaling crew to distinguish a pregnant female from a male,
thus, pregnant females might be killed in violation of article
five.
14. Multilateral-Whaling Regulation, supra note 11.
15. Id. art. 5.
16. Id. art. 6.
17. Id. art. 2.
18. Id. art. 4.
19. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS 172 (D. MacDonald ed. 1984).
20. Id. at 230.
21. See State Sets Rules to Protect Endangered Right Whales, Boston Globe,
Mar. 24, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
22. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, supra note 19, at 230.
23. Id. at 218.
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Furthermore, some calves suckle from underneath their
mothers rather than at their sides. 24 Humans aboard a whaling boat are not able to see a suckling calf from the surface of
the ocean, and thus these females might also be wrongfully
killed. Finally, minke whales, a relatively abundant species
that is favored by some whalers, are almost indistinguishable
from the pygmy right whales. 25 The Multilateral-Whaling
Regulation prohibits the taking of pygmy right whales,2 6 yet
the possibility remains that they will be killed due to their
similarity to minke whales.
The Multilateral-Whaling Regulation also includes an
opt-out provision contained in virtually all international whaling treaties and conventions.2 7 Article twenty provides that
any contracting party may "declare that. . the present Convention shall not apply to any territories named in such declaration. '2 s Thus, a contracting party can relieve itself of the
regulations and prohibitions contained in the Convention.
Furthermore, because the Multilateral-Whaling Regulation
does not discuss trade with non-parties, a contracting party
can hire a non-party to take whales in violation of the
Convention.2 9
B.

Multilateral-Whaling Convention

The International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (Multilateral-Whaling Convention) was ratified on
December 2, 1946.30 The Multilateral-Whaling Convention
supplemented the 1931 Multilateral-Whaling Regulation by
providing further protection to the whales of the world. 1 The
24. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, SUPRA note 19, at 236.
25. Id. at 234.
26. Multilateral-Whaling Regulation, supra note 11, art. 4.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40, 85 & 231.
28. Multilateral-Whaling Regulation, supra note 11, art. 20.
29. Kindt and Wintheiser, The Conservation and Protection of Marine Mammals, 7 U. HAW. L. REV. 301, 336 (1985); See also Kindt, A Summary of Issues Involving Marine Mammals and Highly Migratory Species, 18 AKRON L. REV. 1, 8 (1984).
30. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62
Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter Multilateral-Whaling
Convention].
31. S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 18 (1985).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/16
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Multilateral-Whaling Convention, like its predecessor, is primarily regulatory. The preamble to this Convention expressly
states that its purpose is to "make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry. 3' The Multilateral-Whaling
Convention calls for the taking of whales "best able to sustain
exploitation" in order to give depleted species a chance to recover.3 3 Presumably, once recovered, a depleted species could
again be subjected to the destructive forces of the whaling
industry.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the MultilateralWhaling Convention is article III(1), which establishes the International Whaling Commission (IWC). The IWC was
formed in order to organize studies, collect data on whale
populations, and to act as a general information center for the
contracting parties." ' Although the IWC was intended to be
an impartial body, it has been criticized for serving the whaling industry rather than protecting depleted whale stocks.3 5
The IWC is authorized to amend the provisions of the schedule36 by adopting different regulations, and has taken advantage of this provision by amending the schedule frequently.3
The latest amendment has placed a ban on all commercial
whaling subject to certain exceptions.3 8
Despite the commercial ban, whaling continues because of
loopholes in the Multilateral-Whaling Convention. The first
major loophole is found in article V(3), which provides contracting parties with an opportunity to object to any amendment. This objection procedure is analogous to the opt-out
32. Multilateral-Whaling Convention, supra note 30, preamble.

33. Id.
34. Id. art. IV.
35. Levin, Toward Effective CetaceanProtection, 12 NAT. RESOURCES L. 549, 579
(1979).
36. Multilateral-Whaling Convention, supra note 30, art. V. Schedules are the
portion of the Whaling Regulation that sets forth which species may be taken, and
which cannot.
37. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 9433, TREATIES
IN FORCE

385 (1989).

38. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946: Amendments
to the Schedule, Aug. 27, 1980, para. 10(c), 32 U.S.T. 4242, T.I.A.S. No. 9946, U.N.T.S.
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procedure found in the Multilateral-Whaling Regulation. 9
Any government that presents an objection to the IWC within
ninety days of the new amendment will not be held to the
provisions of that amendment. 0 The three major whaling
states, the USSR, Japan, and Norway, consistently object to
the IWC's amendments. 41 The USSR and Japan are responsible for eighty percent of all the whaling that occurs. 2 Thus, if
these countries object to a restriction or an outright ban on
whaling, the purpose of the restriction is defeated.
The second loophole contained in the Multilateral-Whaling Convention is found in article 1(2) which provides that the
Convention only applies to contracting parties.43 This exemption leads to pirate whaling and increased trade with non-parties, thus defeating the purpose of the Convention.4 " A contracting party can avoid the prohibitions of the MultilateralWhaling Convention by operating under a non-party flag or
hiring non-parties to whale for them. This allows the contracting parties to avoid compliance with the regulations,
while at the same time appearing to comply, thus avoiding political pressure from the parties that actually do observe the
terms of the Convention. 5
The third major loophole in the Multilateral-Whaling
Convention is the scientific-taking exception found in article
VIII(l). This article allows a contracting party's own government, contrary to the Convention, to grant special permits authorizing the taking of whales in the name of science.4 Although a scientific committee reviews the permits before they
are issued and makes recommendations regarding their sub39. Multilateral-Whaling Regulation, supra note 11, art. 20.
40. Multilateral-Whaling Convention, supra note 30, art. V(3)(a)-(c).
41. LYSTER, supra note 31, at 27. For example, when a schedule bans the taking
of a certain species, some countries will file an objection and continue to kill these
whales despite the ban.
42. Levin, supra note 35, at 550.
43. Multilateral-Whaling Convention, supra note 30, art. 1(2).
44. LYSTER, supra note 31, at 29.
45. Id. Likewise American tuna fisherman have used a similar device to avoid
complying with the Marine Mammal Protection Act's limits on killing dolphins.
Brower, The Destruction of Dolphins, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1989, at 35, 58.
46. Multilateral-Whaling Convention, supra note 30, art. VIII.
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stance, these recommendations are not always followed.'7 For
example, in 1982, Denmark applied for a permit to take nine
fin whales. The scientific committee rejected the application,
but Denmark awarded itself a permit to take three whales despite the protests of the committee.""
Another problem with the Multilateral-Whaling Convention is the lack of enforcement mechanisms, a recurring theme
in international wildlife treaties. In 1971, the International
Observer Scheme (IOS) was initiated in order to provide a
method of enforcement. 49 The IOS allows observers to be
placed on foreign whaling vessels to monitor the actual
catches and the accuracy of the kills reported. This scheme
was developed to prevent illegal catches from being reported
as legal ones, and to ensure that honest mistakes were not
made, or if made, were reported. Because a party's national
inspectors may be biased and allow certain irregularities to occur, the IOS observers are appointed by, and are responsible
to, the IWC.5 0 However, it is the party being observed that
pays the observer."
The United States-Japan International Observer Scheme
provides an example of how the IOS program works. 2 The
parties, expressing concern for the conservation of whale
stocks and for continued productivity of the whaling industry,
developed a surveillance scheme.5 Observers are given the
status of senior officials,5 ' and are allowed to freely observe
the activities that take place at the land stations (the ports at
which the whaling vessels dock to unload and process the
dead whales).5 5 Specifically, the observers are instructed to
47.

LYSTER, supra note 31, at 30.
48. Id.
49. Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention of
1946, July 6, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 179, T.I.A.S. No. 7293,
- U.N.T.S. _.
50. Whaling: International Observer Scheme, May 2, 1975, United States-Japan,
art. 2, 26 U.S.T. 1009, T.I.A.S. No. 8088 [hereinafter IOS].
51. Id. art. 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 3(1).
55. Id. art. 3(3).
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note the species, number, size, and sex of all whales taken."
The most important part of the 1OS is contained in article
3(6). Under this provision, observers are required to report
any infractions to the manager of the land station, the senior
national inspector, and the IWC. 57 Although neither the IOS
nor the Multilateral-Whaling Convention provide penalties
for violations, it is logical to assume that noncomplying parties will be dealt with politically.
Despite the two whaling conventions presently in effect,
and the IOS enacted to enforce these conventions, many
whale species are threatened with extinction. 8 Although the
world population of whales is on the rise because of decreased
whaling, isolation of particular whale stocks may result in the
extinction of certain species. 9 Furthermore, much of the
whaling that takes place is unnecessary. Sperm whales, listed
as an endangered species pursuant to the Endangered Species
Act,"0 are hunted extensively despite the fact that their meat
is inedible." They are killed for spermaceti, a unique oil
found only in sperm whales, which is valued for use as a lubricant in missiles.6 2 Jojoba oil has the same properties as spermaceti and would work equally as well.6 However, sperm
whales are continually hunted for their oil, and it is unlikely
that the military will turn to jojoba oil until the whales are no
longer available.
C.

The Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments

The United States has attempted to facilitate enforcement of the two whaling conventions with unilateral action.
The Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of
1967 (Pelly Amendment) was the first of these enforcement
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 3(6).
58. In 1988, there were eight whale species listed as endangered pursuant to the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1988).
59. See Kindt and Wintheiser, supra note 29, at 321.
60. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1988).
61. Levin, supra note 35, at 587.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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attempts." The Pelly Amendment authorizes the United
States government to initiate economic sanctions against
countries whose activities "diminished the effectiveness" of
the IWC's conservation measures.6 5 Unfortunately, the term
"diminish the effectiveness" was not defined in the amendment, and the courts interpreting the provision have held that
66
imposition of economic sanctions is a discretionary act.
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment) 67 allegedly removed the discretionary element
contained in the Pelly Amendment. 8 The PackwoodMagnuson Amendment mandates the imposition of economic
sanctions against countries whose activities diminished the effectiveness of the IWC's conservation measures. Unfortunately, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was emasculated by the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whaling
Association v. American Cetacean Society.69 In that case, the
Court upheld the President's decision not to impose economic
sanctions against Japan, despite Japan's refusal to comply
with the IWC's ban on commercial whaling. 70 Thus, both congressional attempts to supplement IWC authority to enforce
the whaling regulations have largely failed.
While the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whaling
constituted a major setback for whale conservationists,7 1 the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment has been effective in other
cases. For example, Norway agreed to stop whaling in 1987 if
the United States promised not to impose economic sanctions,
thus ensuring the continued importation of approximately one
hundred and forty-three million dollars worth of seafood into
the United States each year. 72 Furthermore, in 1985, Iceland
64. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982).
65. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1982).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(b) (1982).
67. Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988).
68. Note, Woe for the Whales, CINCINNATTI L. REV. 1285, 1292 (1987).
69. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
70. Id. at 241.
71. Note, supra note 68, at 1301.
72. Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1986, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 701, 710 (1987).
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cancelled its plans to kill one hundred and twenty whales for
"scientific" purposes as a result of pressure from the United
States. 73 But the sword is double edged: the IWC is too vulnerable to politics. In 1978, Japan threatened to cancel a ten
million dollar sugar deal with Panama in retaliation for the
Panamanians placing an anti-whaling proposal on IWC's
agenda.74 Until the IWC can be insulated from political pressure, exporting nations (and the whales themselves) will be at
the mercy of the economically stronger importing nations.
D. Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
Convention
In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty was ratified by Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the USSR, Great Britain, and the United
States. 75 The primary purposes of the Antarctic Treaty were
to demilitarize the Antarctic, to prohibit the dumping of radioactive waste and detonation of nuclear bombs on the continent, and to preclude assertions of claims to territorial sovereignty. 76 The Antarctic Treaty contains no specific
environmental provisions, but it does give each party the authority to make recommendations as to the preservation and
conservation of living resources.77 The parties to the Antarctic
Treaty subsequently drafted the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources pursuant to this
7
authority.
The Antarctic Marine Convention was ratified on May 20,
1980. 7 1 The Antarctic Marine Convention, similar to the whaling conventions, was enacted to regulate the takings of
73. Id.
74. Kindt and Wintheiser, supra note 29, at 331.
75. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.
76. Id. arts. I, IV and V.
77. Id. art. IX(1)(f).
78. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May
20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 [hereinafter Antarctic Marine
Convention].
79. Id.
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Antarctic marine life in order to ensure continued harvesting80 The conservation measures encompass all living organisms,8 and the definition of conservation includes "rational
use." 2 The Antarctic Marine Convention differs from the
whaling conventions however, because it takes an ecosystemic
approach. In other words, the Convention attempts to protect
economically-valuable species by protecting the entire community of interrelated organisms. Article 11(3) mandates that
harvesting be performed in a way that "maint[ains] . . .the

ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources.

8

3

De-

spite this environmentally sound reasoning, the Convention's
main objective is to regulate the taking of krill, the primary
food source of baleen whales. 4 Thus, the Antarctic Marine
Convention is yet another way to ensure the survival of the
whaling industry.
The Antarctic Marine Convention also allows a contracting party to opt-out of any conservation measure if that
party is "unable to accept the conservation measure."8 5 Again,
this type of loophole ensures that any kind of harvesting can
occur, despite the protective measures contained in the
Convention.
The Antarctic Marine Convention provides for two methods of international enforcement. First, article VII mandates
that the contracting parties form a commission, whose function is to carry out the Convention's conservation measures.8 ,
The Antarctic Marine Convention further requires the commission to draw attention to any party or nonparty whose activities affect the implementation of the Convention.8 7 In this
way, contracting parties in compliance with the Convention
can place political pressure on noncomplying states to con80.
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. art. 1(2).
Id. art. H(3).
Id. art. II(3)(b).
LYSTER, supra note 31, at 158.
Antarctic Marine Convention, supra note 78, art. IX (6)(c).
Id. arts. VII, IX.
Id. art. X.
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form with the Convention's provisions. Second, the Antarctic
Marine Convention mandates a system of observation and inspection whereby members of the Commissioh may board vessels to search out infractions. 8 These two schemes enable parties to monitor the harvesting activities of other countries,
thus inhibiting violations of the conservation measures.
Most international wildlife treaties and conventions are
enacted after some valuable resource is depleted, extinction
threatens not only the animal itself, but the industry based on
its exploitation. However, one unusual aspect of the Antarctic
Marine Convention is that it was enacted prior to any heavy
commercial use of the Antarctic. 8 This fact lends more support to the theory that this Convention was enacted to protect
the whaling industry. Many species of baleen whales were
threatened with extinction in 1980,90 and, by protecting the
krill, contracting parties could increase the likelihood that
whaling could continue."
E. Conservation of Antarctic Seals Convention
The Antarctic Seals Convention92 is couched in terms of
"harvesting" seals and promoting the "optimum sustainable
yield" of animals.9 3 It also prohibits the taking of certain seal
species that are threatened with extinction."
Thus the
Antarctic Seal Convention has both regulatory and prohibitory elements. Unfortunately, even the prohibition on taking
certain species is subject to exceptions.9 5 A party may kill any
seal species in limited quantities in order to feed men or dogs,
to provide specimens for museums or other educational institutions, or for scientific research purposes."
88. Id. art. XXIV.
89. LYSTER, supra note 31, at 157.
90. Comment, Cetacean Rights Under Human Laws, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 911,
912 (1984).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
92. Antarctic Seal Convention, supra note 13.
93. Id. preamble.
94. Id. art. 2(1).
95. Id. art. 4(1).
96. Id. art. 4(1)(a)-(c).
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The Antarctic Seal Convention, like the Antarctic Marine
Convention,97 claims to take an ecosystemic conservation approach. In its preamble, the drafters state that the Antarctic
Seal Convention is enacted in order to "promote and achieve
the objectives of protection, scientific study and rational use
of Antarctic seals, and to maintain a satisfactory balance
within the ecological system." 98 However, the remainder of
the Antarctic Seal Convention is concerned solely with the use
of seals for human consumption. The ecosystemic conservation approach is mentioned at only one other point in the
Antarctic Seal Convention: the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR) is "invited" to inform other parties of the fact that harvesting is having a "significantly harmful effect

. . .

on the ecological system in any particular local-

ity."99

Nevertheless, once this fact is disclosed, neither SCAR
nor the parties are under any obligation to remedy the damage to the ecosystem.100
F. Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific
Fur Seals

On February 9, 1957, Canada, Japan, the USSR, and the
United States ratified the Convention on the Conservation of
North Pacific Fur Seals.'01 Although the Fur Seal Convention
was intended to be temporary, it has been extended and is
still in force today.102 The primary purpose of the Fur Seal
Convention is to sustain the maximum "productivity of fur
seal resources" and to "produce the greatest harvest" of
97. Antarctic Marine Convention, supra note 78.
98. Id. preamble.

99. Id. art. 5(4)(b).
100. Antarctic Seal Convention, supra note 13. The duties under article 5(4)(b)

end here. The discretionary language indicates that SCAR and the parties are under
no further obligations.
101. Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9,
1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Fur Seal
Convention].
102. Protocol amending the Fur Seal Convention, Oct. 14, 1980, T.I.A.S. No.
10020. This Protocol is implemented by the Fur Seal Act 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187
(1988). See also M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1983).
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seals.10 3 Article III of the Fur Seal Convention prohibits pelagic sealing.10 4 However, the Fur Seal Convention allows exceptions to the ban on pelagic sealing, and regulates the taking of seals found on land.10 5 The Fur Seal Convention does
not address either the preservation of the ecosystem or the
habitat in which the seals live.
G. Convention on the Conservation of Polar Bears
The Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (Polar Bear Convention) was ratified in 1973.106 The preamble to
the Convention discusses polar bears as a "resource" that
must be "managed.' 0 7 Polar bears are valued for their thick,
white pelt and for their meat. Polar bears are the largest carnivorous quadrupeds in the world, and are distributed around
the pole in the northern hemisphere.108 Adult polar bears
travel approximately forty-three miles per day in search of
food, and one tagged bear was found to have traveled six hundred and ninety-four miles in one year. 10 9 Thus, the bears can
travel across the boundaries of Alaska, Canada, Greenland,
and the USSR.
Females deliver one to three cubs every three years," 0 so
the population replacement rate is relatively slow. This slow
reproductive rate, coupled with the number of bears killed
each year, threatens these animals with significant population
decline. For example, in 1984, Canadians took approximately
six hundred bears. Alaskan Eskimos take approximately one
hundred per year, and Greenland takes between one hundred
and twenty-five and one hundred and fifty per year."'
103. Fur Seal Convention, supra note 101.
104. Id. art. I. Pelagic sealing is defined as the killing, taking, or pursuing of seals
in the sea.
105. Id. art. IX.
106. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
3918, T.I.A.S. No. 8409 [hereinafter Polar Bear Convention].
107. Id. preamble.
108. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAMMALS, supra note 19, at 92.
109. Id. at 92-93.
110. Id. at 92.
111. Id. at 93.
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The Polar Bear Convention prohibits the taking of polar
bears with the following exceptions: for bona fide scientific
purposes, for conservation purposes, to prevent disturbance of
the management of other living resources, takings by local
peoples using traditional hunting methods, or takings by a
party's nationals if done by traditional means.1 12 If a polar
bear is killed for conservation purposes, or under the prevention of disturbance to other living resources exception, the individual who killed the bear must forfeit the skin and all
other valuable items to his party." 3 Furthermore, the party is
prohibited from putting these forfeited items to commercial
use." ' This ensures that parties will not kill polar bears in the
name of conservation or protection, and then profit from the
violation of the treaty.
The Polar Bear Convention is similar to the Antarctic
Seal Convention because it mandates that the parties "shall
. . . protect the ecosystems of which polar bears are a part
... ,,
1 "In particular, parties must protect areas used by
the bears for denning, feeding, and migration." ' Because
these bears can be highly migratory, this protection can extend to large areas of land. The mandatory duty to protect
denning sites is particularly important because there are relatively few places where a female polar bear can den her
cubs. 1 7 This mandate, if strictly enforced by the contracting
parties, can have serious ramifications for oil, gas, and mineral
exploitation."' It remains to be seen how effective the Polar
Bear Convention will be, especially in light of the recent interest in oil and gas exploration in the Arctic region." 9 It is unlikely that this Convention will be a major consideration when
the final decision is made.
112. Polar Bear Convention, supra note 106, arts. I, III (1)(a)-(e).
113. Id. art. III (1)(c).
114. Id. art. 111 (2).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
(1988).

Id. art. II.
Id.
LysTEIR, supra note 31, at 60.
Id.
Lee, Oil in the Wilderness: An Arctic Dilemma, 174 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 858

17

92

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

Presently, the greatest threat to polar bears is not hunting, but the pollution that has found its way to the Arctic region. 11° Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), and heavy metals have all been found
in the tissues of polar bears,121 and it is inevitable that these
toxins will eventually contribute to the decline of the species.
The Convention's mandate to protect the polar bear's ecosystem12 2 should include preventing pollutants such as PCBs,
DDT, and heavy metals from invading the Arctic region.
Their presence suggests that the Convention's actual protection is not as broad as its ecosystemic conservation approach
suggests.
The implementing United States legislation for
preserving marine mammals, the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
subchapter two (MMPA), 12 3 has limited international application. The MMPA includes a moratorium on the taking and
importation of marine mammals and marine mammal products.1 24 However, the MMPA also provides for exceptions to
this moratorium: marine mammals may be taken in the name
of scientific research, for public display, or to enhance the recovery of the species.' 25 Finally, the MMPA gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to ban imports of fish
taken in operations which resulted in incidental kills of
marine mammals. 126 The MMPA's eventual goal is to eliminate all incidental killings that occur during fishing operations.127 The MMPA does not address the preservation of
marine mammal habitat, and does not specifically mention
marine mammal treaties and conventions, other than the Fur
1 28
Seal Convention.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 29, at 349.
Id.
Polar Bear Convention, supra note 106, art. II.
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1407 (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1988).
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H. Migratory Bird Treaty: United States-Great Britain
The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds
(US-GB) was the first in a series of four migratory bird treaties signed by the United States.'2 9 The US-GB has an extremely utilitarian purpose: the preamble expresses a desire to
protect birds that are valued as food, or that destroy insects
that forage on human agricultural crops. 130 The protection extends only to migratory birds and covered groups of birds,
rather than individual species.' 3 ' The US-GB mandates closed
seasons on hunting, 132 and also prohibits the taking of nests or
eggs.' 3 3 This early treaty, however, is also replete with exceptions to the prohibitions. For example, either party can unilaterally decide to take the nests or eggs of the protected birds
for "scientific or propagating purposes.' ' 1s Furthermore, either party can issue permits to take any bird which becomes
"injurious to the agricultural or other interests in any particular community.' ' 3 5 The US-GB does not provide for methods
of international inspection, reporting, or enforcement, and
Great Britain and the United States are free to kill any bird
1 36
that is deemed "injurious" for any reason.
I.

Migratory Bird Treaty: United States-Mexico

The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds
and Game Mammals (US-M) was ratified on February 7,
1936.'" 7 This second migratory bird treaty was enacted for a
similar purpose: to ensure the rational utilization of birds for
sport, food, commerce, and industry.'3 8 The US-M like the
129. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United
States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628 [hereinafter US-GB].
130. Id. preamble.
131. Id. art. I.
132. Id. art. II(1)-(3).
133. Id. art. V.
134. Id.
135. Id. art. VII.
136. US-GB, supra note 129, art. VII.
137. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb.
7, 1936, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912 [hereinafter US-M].
138. Id. preamble.

19

94

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

US-GB establishes closed hunting seasons.' 39 However, the
US-M goes one step further and mandates refuge zones 1in
40
which the taking of the protected birds will be prohibited.
Bird hunting from aircraft is also prohibited."'
The migratory birds protected by the US-M are listed by
family." 2 Therefore, all species within a listed family are protected. Although the transportation of these birds across the
United States-Mexican border is prohibited," 3 each party
may kill protected birds within its own country if the birds
become "injurious to agriculture and constitute plagues,
as
4
farms.'
game
or
reserves
from
come
they
when
as
well
J.

Migratory Bird Treaty: United States-Japan

Thirty-six years passed before the United States signed
another migratory bird treaty."4 5 The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction
and Their Environment (US-J) is the first migratory bird
treaty that suggests birds have value other than their economic value."" The preamble of the US-J states that birds are
"a natural resource of great value for recreational, aesthetic,
scientific, and economic purposes. . . ."" The US-J also recognizes that some species are in danger of extinction," 8 and
that the two countries want to take steps to prevent this
extinction.
The US-J protects migratory birds if positive evidence of
migration between the two countries exists," 9 or if there are
139. Id. art. II(A),(C)-(D).
140. Id. art. II(B).
141. Id. art. II(F).
142. Id. art. IV.
143. Id. art. III.
144. Id. art. II(E).
145. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of
Extinction, and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, United States-Japan, 25 U.S.T.
3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990 [hereinafter US-J].
146. See supra text accompanying notes 129-144.
147. US-J, supra note 145, preamble.
148. Id.
149. Id. art. II(1)(a).
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species or subspecies of birds common to both countries. 150
The US-J lists the protected birds by species rather than family. 151 Thus, not all the species within a particular family are
protected. The taking of the listed birds or their eggs is prohibited,'5 2 but this prohibition is subject to a number of exceptions. For example, listed birds may be taken for "scientific, educational, propagative or other specific purposes not
inconsistent with the objective of this Convention."'' 5 Furthermore, listed birds can be killed in order to protect persons
or property, during open hunting seasons, on private game
farms, and by Eskimos, Indians, or other indigenous
peoples. 5 4
The US-J affords special protection to island environments, 5 5 and specifically mandates the preservation of the environment in which the birds live. 5 6 The US-J also mandates
that the parties seek means to prevent "damage resulting
from pollution of the seas."'1 5 7 Finally, the US-J suggests that
the parties "endeavor to establish sanctuaries" for the
birds.1'5
K.

Migratory Bird Treaty: United States-USSR

The most recent migratory bird treaty, the Convention
Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds (US-USSR),
was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. 59 The
US-USSR is designed to protect birds for their "scientific, economic, aesthetic, cultural, educational, recreational, and ecological value."' 60 The protected birds are listed by family and
150. Id. art. II(1)(b).
151. Id. annex.
152. Id. art. III(1).
153. Id. art. III(1)(a).
154. Id. art. III(1)(b)-(e).
155. Id. art. VI(2).
156. Id. art. VI.
157. Id. art. VI(a).
158. Id. art. 111(3).
159. Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds, Nov. 19, 1976,
United States-USSR, 29 U.S.T. 4647, T.I.A.S. No. 9073 [hereinafter US-USSR].
160. Id. preamble.
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species,' and are only listed if they are known to migrate or
if populations of birds common to both countries share breeding, feeding, wintering, or molting areas.1 6 2
Article II of the US-USSR lists the exceptions to the general prohibition of killing the listed birds. Birds may be killed
for scientific, educational, propagative, or other specific purposes not inconsistent with the US-USSR, during open hunting seasons, by indigenous peoples in order to meet nutritional and other essential needs, or for the protection of
persons or property. 6 ' The parties are also encouraged "[t]o
the extent possible, . . . [to] undertake measures to protect
and enhance the environment of migratory birds and to prevent and abate the pollution or environmental alteration of
that environment."'6 4 If this provision were phrased in terms
of mandatory duties imposed on the parties, rather than a
precatory statement, it would be an extremely broad-reaching
provision.
The US-USSR is the only one of the four migratory bird
treaties to recognize the importance of ecological diversity.
Article IV requires that the parties identify areas of special
importance to the birds, including areas "which require special protection because of their ecological diversity."'6 5 The
US-USSR also recognizes that a species can be in danger of
extinction despite a large worldwide population. Article V
provides that special protective measures will be developed if
"a species, subspecies or distinct segment of a population of
migratory bird is in danger of extinction."' 6 6 Thus, a bird can
be a member of a common species, and still be protected
under the US-USSR if the local population is small. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, the US-USSR mandates that
each party "shall to the maximum extent possible, undertake
measures necessary to establish preserves, refuges, protected
areas, and also facilities intended for the conservation of mi161. Id. art. 1(3).

162. Id. art. I(1)(a)-(b).
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

II(1)(a)-(d).
IV(1).
IV(2)(c).
V(2).
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gratory birds and their environment, and to manage such areas so as to preserve and restore the natural ecosystem." 6 '
The US-USSR is the strongest of the four migratory bird
treaties. Historically, protection was initially afforded only to
birds that were of economic value. 6 ' Gradually, the parties
recognized that other birds had inherent aesthetic value, and
protection was extended to encompass these species as well. 1 69
The most important step was taken when protection was extended to the habitats in which these birds live. 70 If the parties to this US-USSR actually strive to minimize environmental harm and pollution, and create sanctuaries and preserves
for birds, then we will be one step closer to preserving ecological diversity.
The United States Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)
implements the preceding four bird treaties.1 7 ' The MBTA
authorizes the Secretary of Interior to issue such regulations
as may be necessary to implement the provisions of the four
conventions. 72 However, the Secretary has thus far only issued regulations regarding the importation and exportation of
73
migratory birds.
L.

Western Hemisphere Convention

The Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere (Western Hemisphere Convention) was ratified on October 12, 1940, and was
a convention ahead of its time. 74 The Western Hemisphere
Convention was signed by Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Dominican Republic, United States, Venezuela, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, and
167. Id. art. VII.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 129-144.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 145 and 159.
170. Id.
171. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 712 (1988) [hereinafter MBTA].
172. Id.
173. 50 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-14.204 (1988).
174. Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1355, T.S. 981, 161 U.N.T.S. 193 [hereinafter
Western Hemisphere Convention].
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Chile. 175 Its objectives are to protect all native plants and animals from extinction, to protect primitive regions, and to protect regions of aesthetic, historic, or scientific value. 176 Article
II of the Western Hemisphere Convention requires the contracting parties to explore the possibility of establishing national parks, national reserves, or national monuments. 1"7 The
Convention mandates that the resources of these reserves
"shall not be subject to exploitation for commercial profit.' 78
There is a direct prohibition on "hunting, killing and capturing" wildlife within these national parks.' 7 9 The exceptions
to the taking of animals, unlike all the other treaties and conventions examined thus far, are extremely narrow. Animals
may be killed or captured only "by or under the direction or
control of the park authorities, or for duly authorized scientific investigations."'8 0 Furthermore, the Western Hemisphere
Convention mandates education programs for the public. 8" '
An educated public is less likely to harass or kill the wildlife
existing in the park systems.
Article V of the Western Hemisphere Convention, if
strongly drafted, would have been a powerful tool for use by
wildlife conservationists. Unfortunately, the article merely
asks the contracting parties to "propose" laws to protect wildlife in their prospective countries, outside the parks' borders.' 82 Despite this weakly-drafted provision, the Convention
protects wildlife by three methods. First, as previously mentioned, wildlife within the parks, reserves, and monuments
cannot be killed or captured unless authorized by park personnel. 83 Second, article VII mandates that the contracting
parties protect "migratory birds of economic or aesthetic
value or prevent the threatened extinction of any given spe175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

signatory page.
preamble.
art. II(1).
art. III.

181. Id.
182. Id. art. V(1).
183. Id. art. III.
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cies."'' Third, article VIII provides that the parties shall create an annex of wildlife species whose protection "is declared
to be of special urgency and importance."' 185 Annexed species
"shall be protected as completely as possible, and their hunting, killing, capturing, or taking shall be allowed only with the
1' 86
permission of the appropriate government authorities.'
Permission to take one of these animals will be given only in
or when essential for the
order to "further scientific purposes,
87
administration of the area.'
In theory, the Western Hemisphere Convention offers
broad protection not only to many species of wildlife, but to
their habitats as well. However, the Convention has been referred to as a "sleeping convention," a convention of limited
practical value.' 8 8 Its annex has not been revised since 1967,189
and the weakly-drafted provisions of article V render the protection of wildlife ineffectual. The strength of the Western
Hemisphere Convention lies in its possibilities.'10 Future wildlife treaties and conventions should mandate, rather than suggest, such sweeping protections.
M. Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was signed by the
United States on March 3, 1973.1'' Its goal is to neutralize the
destructive impacts of international wildlife trade on the survival of endangered or threatened species, 92 and it has been
called the most successful of all international wildlife trea184. Id. art. VII.
185. Id. art. VIII.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. LYSTER, supra note 31, at 98.
189. Id. at 106.
190. Id. at 97-111.
191. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
192. Comment, supra note 8, at 10228.

25

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

ties. 193 The preamble to CITES recognizes that wildlife is "an
irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which
must be protected," and is valuable "from aesthetic, scientific,
cultural, recreational and economic points of view.' 1

94

The

Convention is designed to afford three levels of protection to
wildlife, depending upon biological status. Species are listed
in one of three appendices: appendix I species consist of all
species "threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade";'9 5 appendix II species are those that are not
presently threatened with extinction, but may become so because of the high volume of trade, or because they appear similar to appendix I species;19 and appendix III species are
those species "which any Party identifies as being subject to
regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing
or restricting exploitation."' 97
Appendix I specimens cannot be traded without both an
import permit and an export permit.' 98 An export permit will
only be granted if a scientific authority of the state of export
determines that the exportation will not be detrimental to the
survival of the species, and it has been determined that the
particular specimen was not obtained illegally. 9 9 Furthermore, if an animal is to be shipped live, the state of export
must determine that the animal will be shipped so "as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment,"
and the exporting state must be satisfied that an import permit has been granted.200 An import permit will be granted
only if the scientific authority of the state of import has determined that "the import will be for purposes which are not
detrimental to the survival of the species involved," '0 and the
state of import is satisfied that the recipient of a living speci193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

LYSTER, supra note 31, at 240.

CITES, supra note 191, preamble.
Id. art. II(1).
Id. art. 11(2).
Id. art. 11(3).
Id. art. iII(2)-(3).
Id. art. III(2)(a)-(b).
Id. art. III(2)(c)-(d).
Id. art. III(3)(a).
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men is equipped to care for the animal properly. 202 Furthermore, the state of import must determine that the specimen
will not be used primarily for commercial purposes.20 3
Trade in appendix II specimens requires only an export
permit,20 4 which should be issued only when the scientific authority of the state of export determines that the export will
not be detrimental to the survival of the species, 0 5 and that
the specimen was not obtained illegally. 206 Finally, if a live
animal is to be exported, the exporting state must determine
that the animal will be shipped so as to "minimize the risk of
'20 7
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.
The exportation of appendix III specimens is allowed
only if the exporting state determines that the specimen was
not obtained illegally, and if a live specimen, that it will be
shipped to minimize the risk of injury to the animal. 208 The
importing state must examine only the export permit and a
certificate of origin.20 9
Article I of CITES defines species as "any species, subspecies, or geographically separate population thereof. '2 10 A
party therefore can list a population of animals in appendix
III of CITES, regardless of the species' abundance elsewhere
in the world. This enables a country to protect its own wildlife
from potential extinction in that country. One of CITES' major weaknesses is also found in article I. "Specimen" is defined
as "any animal . . . [or] any readily recognizable part or derivative thereof."2 1 ' The term "readily recognizable" is not defined elsewhere in CITES, and thus creates a loophole. As one
commentator has noted, leaving the term "readily recognizable" to be defined by individual parties allows countries to circumvent compliance with CITES because of "technical" in202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

III(3)(b).
III(3)(c).
IV(2).
IV(2)(a).
IV(2)(b).
IV(2)(c).
V(a)-(b).
V(3).
1(a).
I(b)(ii).
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ability to recognize a protected species "part" or
"derivative."2 1' 2 For example, China, a party to CITES since
1981, is technically able to export manufactured drugs containing rhinoceros horn (trade in the endangered rhinoceros is
prohibited under CITES) because China claims it is unable to
readily recognize the derivative-powdered-rhinoceros horn in
the manufactured end-product.2 13
An identification manual, possibly supplemented with
confiscated samples of readily recognizable parts, is currently
being prepared. 2" This manual, if distributed to customs officials worldwide, should assist in the identification of illegally
imported specimens.
CITES' other provisions are also susceptible to abuse. For
example, article VII creates an exemption for the import or
export of specimens that are "personal or household effects."2'15 A high percentage of wildlife products is sold to
tourists,21 and it is far too simple for a tourist to claim that
the item in question was purchased in .his home state, or that
it was purchased before CITES came into effect. The failure
to define "personal or household effects" may lead to the
abuse of this exception. As long as tourists continue to
purchase items from illegally-killed animals, the poaching of
protected species will continue. Moreover as long as tourists
are successful in bringing these items home, they will continue
to buy.
Article X of CITES permits trade in listed species by
countries that are not parties to the Convention, provided
those countries issue comparable documents which substantially conform to those required of parties to CITES.2 17 Approximately thirty percent of wildlife trade occurs with nonparties,21 8 and CITES encourages and rewards non-parties for
212. Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 142.
213. Demand for Rhino Horn Falls, IUCN BULL., Apr.-June 1983, at 36.
214. Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 142.
215. CITES, supra note 191, art. VII.
216. Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 136.
217. CITES, supra, note 191, art. X. See also McFadden, Asian Compliance
with CITES: Problems and Prospects, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J., 311, 317 (1987).
218. Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 131.
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this behavior by giving them a monopoly in the market.2 19 For
example, Singapore, a country with virtually no indigenous
wildlife, was notorious as a "laundering" port for illegal wildlife trade until 1986, the year it ratified CITES.2 2 0 If trade
with non-parties were forbidden, non-parties would be able to
trade only among themselves, and the demand for these wildlife products would decrease.
The absence of a treaty-wide enforcement structure for
CITES,2 2 1 coupled with poor national enforcement constitutes
another major flaw in CITES. TRAFFIC, a group funded by
the World Wildlife Fund, transported a cactus through ten
countries to test the effectiveness of CITES. Almost all species of cactus are listed in one of the appendices of CITES,
and the TRAFFIC members displayed the cactus openly or
declared it. Not one official from any of the ten countries
questioned the "tourist" as to the origin of the cactus. Furthermore, only the United States and the USSR confiscated
the cactus, but both countries confiscated it for health reasons. 22 2 Another example of poor national enforcement occurred with an actual shipment of penguins, which are listed
in appendix I and appendix 11.213 An importing country was
presented with a shipment of wild penguins and an export
permit from Paraguay.22 4 Paraguay is a landlocked country
with a tropical climate. 2 5 Despite the fact that it is widely
known that penguins are indigenous to Arctic regions the importing country allowed the shipment entry without question. 22 1 Examples of flagrant violations such as these indicate
that CITES cannot possibly be effective without efficient national and international enforcement.
Yet another loophole in CITES exists in article VII.
When a new party accedes to CITES, or when a new species is
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 134.
Id. See also McFaddden, supra note 217, at 317.
Comment, supra note 8, at 10225.
Melak, supra note 5, at 263.
Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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listed, there is a lag time which enables a dealer to legally export specimens acquired before the new regulations come into
effect.2 2 7 Thus, dealers can stockpile specimens in anticipation
of new regulations. Great Britain undertook stockpiling immediately before CITES' ratification. When Great Britain was a
non-party, dealers imported approximately twenty-seven
thousand ocelot skins per year.2 When Britain announced its
intention to ratify CITES, this number rose to fifty thousand
ocelot skins per year.2 29 Stockpiling can have a significant adverse effect on the species being imported. A particular population of animals may survive when a steady number of them
are killed each year, but a sudden increase in animals killed
could decimate the entire population.
CITES also permits contracting parties to enter reservations to the listing of a particular species.2 30 This is similar to
the objection and opt-out procedures found in other wildlife
treaties.2 3 Major wildlife importers enter reservations frequently. For example, the USSR has entered six reservations
of appendix I species (five of them on whales), and Japan has
entered reservations to six whales and -seven reptiles.23 2 This
procedure allows contracting parties to comply with CITES
when it suits their needs, but to legally violate CITES when
the economic incentive is simply too great to ignore.2 33
CITES' deterrence mechanisms are also ineffective. Without strict fines or criminal sanctions, violators continue to
trade illegally imported and exported specimens. In 1978,
twenty-five hundred illegally imported alligator hides were
seized from a dealer. The hides were valued at over one million dollars, yet the dealer was fined only thirty-five dollars
per hide.2 34 In 1979, three hundred and nineteen illegally imported cheetah skins were seized. The skins were valued at
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

CITES, supra note 191, art. VII(2).
Melak, supra note 5, at 257.
Id.
CITES, supra note 191, art. XXIII(2).
See supra text accompanying notes 27, 39-40 & 85.
Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 132.
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 154.
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over forty-four thousand dollars, yet the perpetrators were
fined a total of fifteen hundred dollars.131 Violators should be
fined the value of the entire shipment. This may force violators into bankruptcy and thus out of business. Furthermore,
mandatory jail terms for violators would ultimately result in a
number of dealers going out of business. Moreover, increasing
the size of the fines, as well as utilizing mandatory jail terms,
would deter prospective violators from entering the illegal
wildlife trade. If CITES really is to bring species back from
the brink of extinction, illegal trade in these species must be
halted.
Unfortunately, international wildlife trading can be so lucrative that people may always be willing to take significant
risks. 36 In the developing nations of Africa, Latin America,
and Asia, the sale of one animal can support a farmer for the
remainder of his life. 37 This incredible monetary incentive,
coupled with the impoverished lifestyle that many of these
people lead, contributes to the ineffectiveness of CITES. Despite its reputation for effectiveness, proponents of CITES are
unable to give one example of a species that the Convention
has helped.2 38 Wildlife trade is rampant and difficult to control. For example over fifty thousand shipments of wildlife
and wildlife products enter the United States each year, with
only fifty-five wildlife inspectors working at the nine ports of
entry designated for wildlife. 3 9 In 1983, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service randomly inspected fifty imported
shipments, and illegally imported wildlife was found in thirty
of them. 40
The loopholes contained in CITES must be closed to
render the Convention effective in halting illegal wildlife
trade. Perhaps more importantly, national enforcement must
be increased in each contracting country. If the ultimate recipients of illegally imported wildlife and wildlife products
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
Comment, supra note 8, at 10227.
Melak, supra note 5, at 250.
Comment, supra note 8, at 10228.
Id. at 10229.
Id.
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were penalized along with the sellers and dealers, trade would
probably decrease. Finally, educating tourists and indigenous
peoples that their survival depends on the survival of other
animals may slow the volume of trade. Tourists should be encouraged to visit these wild animals in their natural habitats.
Increased tourism would allow people in developing countries
to profit without killing the animals indigenous to the area.
N. International Application of the Endangered Species
Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted on December 28, 1973.241 In the ESA, the United States pledges to
conserve wildlife pursuant to CITES, the Western Hemisphere Convention, the US-GB, US-M, US-J, US-USSR, and
numerous other international agreements.2 4 2 However, the international scope of the ESA is limited.
Section 1537 of the ESA authorizes the President of the
United States to provide financial assistance to foreign nations for species conservation programs.2 4 3 The Secretary of
the Interior, acting through the Secretary of State, may encourage foreign governments to protect threatened or endangered species of wildlife.2 44 The ESA also allows the Secretary
of the Interior to list species as endangered or threatened
even if they are not indigenous to the United States. 24 5 However, the Secretary is not authorized to designate, and thus
protect, critical habitats for endangered species living outside
246
of the United States.
The ESA prohibits the importation of all species listed as
endangered, regardless of whether they are indigenous to the
241. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1530-43 (1988).
242. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
243. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(a) (1988).
244. 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b) (1988).
245. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
246. Solicitor's Op.: Memorandum to the Associate Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, from the Assistant Solicitor for Fish and Wildlife, U.S. Dep't of Interior
(Feb. 13, 1976); see also H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2807.
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United States or not.24 7 The Secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations placing similar prohibitions on the importation of threatened species. 24 8 Furthermore, individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are prohibited
from placing
endangered species into the stream of
2 9
commerce. 4
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the ESA,
the requirement that federal agencies ensure that their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species, 8 ° may not be applicable to federal actions
outside of the United States. Although the proposed rules as
they appeared in the Federal Register did not limit this requirement to actions solely within the United States,2 5 ' the
final rules limited the requirement to "any action . . . in the
United States or upon the high seas. '25 2 The Defenders of
Wildlife challenged this limitation in Defenders of Wildlife v.
Hodel, 53 and on February 15, 1989, the district court ordered
the Secretary of the Interior to amend the regulation to include agency actions in foreign nations within the scope of
section 1536.54 In April of 1989, the Interior Department filed
a notice of appeal, and thus the matter is not yet settled. If
the district court's order is affirmed, the international scope of
the ESA will be extended. Thus endangered species outside of
the United States will be afforded protection from federal actions taken abroad.
0.

The Lacey Act

The Lacey Act 2 55 makes it unlawful for any person to
"import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase
any fish or wildlife . . . taken or possessed in violation of any
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(E)-(F) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
48 Fed. Reg. 29,990 (1983).
51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (1986).
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989).
Id.
The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (1988).
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law, treaty, or regulation." '5 6 Thus, the Lacey Act can be used
to enforce CITES, the ESA, or even foreign laws that protect
wildlife. Furthermore, the Lacey Act makes it unlawful to
"make or submit any false record, account, label, or identification" of wildlife or wildlife products. 5 7 While the prohibitions
contained in the Lacey Act are very broad, the Act requires
that the enforcing government agency know of, and prove the
existence of foreign laws, some of which may be quite obscure.2 58 Despite this one difficulty, the Lacey Act has proved
successful in a few cases.
In Newell v. Baldridge,25 9 the president of Far East
Aquatic Imports imported tropical fish from Asian exporters.
Dealers would call Newell and order fish using a code number.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) investigated
Newell after a Seattle aquarium notified the NMFS that it
received a Hawksbill sea turtle, an endangered species, from
Far East Aquatic Imports. An agent set up a controlled buy of
sea turtles from Newell. When the agent received the package,
the label read "Pantherfish," nevertheless, the agent found
ten Pacific Ridley turtles inside the package. The NMFS
charged Newell with violating the ESA by illegally importing,
selling, and delivering an endangered species, and with violating the Lacey Act by transporting sea turtles in foreign commerce with improper labelling. Newell was found guilty and
fined twenty-three thousand dollars.
In United States v. 3,210 Crusted Hides of Caiman
Crocodilus Yacare,11° inspectors for the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service examined a suspicious shipment that
made an unscheduled stop in Miami, en route from Bolivia to
France. 61 The airway bill and the CITES permit listed the
shipment as Caiman crocodilus crodilus, a species that is not
endangered. 62 Bolivia was given as the country of origin. 6 3
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 3372(4) (1988).
16 U.S.C. § 4221(a).(b) (1988).
548 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
636 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1282-1283.
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However, the customs official noted that Caiman crocodilus
crodilus was not native to Bolivia, and proceeded to examine
the shipment.264 The shipment actually contained 10,870
hides of Caiman
crocodilus yacare, an endangered species na26 5
tive to Bolivia.

The United States then sought forfeiture of the caiman
skins pursuant to the ESA and CITES. Bolivian law provides
that caimans must be a certain size before they can be killed,
and most of the confiscated hides were smaller than the required size. 26 Thus, the United States also sought forfeiture
of the hides pursuant to the Lacey Act.267 The court held that
the entire res was subject to forfeiture pursuant to the Lacey
Act and CITES.268
These cases indicate that the courts are willing to penalize defendants for violations of foreign law pursuant to the
Lacey Act. Thus, the Lacey Act can be a powerful tool when
shipments of wildlife are either mislabeled, or are shipped in
contravention of foreign laws.
P.

The African Elephant Conservation Act

The most recent piece of international wildlife legislation
is the African Elephant Conservation Act (AECA) of 1988.269

The United States, recognizing the soaring global demand for
ivory and the steady decline in elephant populations, enacted
the AECA "to assist in the conservation and protection of the
African elephant.

' 270

The AECA authorizes financial assis-

tance to African-elephant-conservation programs 27 1 and the
AECA also prohibits the importation of ivory from ivory-producing countries that do not adhere to CITES and do not
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
16
16
16

at 1283.

at 1285.
at 1287.
U.S.C. §§ 4201-4245 (1988).
U.S.C. § 4203(1) (1988).
U.S.C. § 4211 (1988).
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have an effective elephant conservation program. 2 The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to establish a moratorium
on the importation of ivory from intermediary countries that
273
do not adhere to CITES.
In addition the AECA makes it unlawful for any person
to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivoryproducing country, 274 or to import ivory from an ivory-producing country in violation of that country's laws.2 75 Furthermore,
it is illegal for any person to "import raw or worked ivory
from a country for which a moratorium is in effect. '276 The
Secretary of the Interior has already established a moratorium
2 77
on the importation of ivory from seventy-nine countries.
It is still too early to tell whether the AECA will be effective in halting the illegal importation of ivory into the United
States. The AECA is drafted well and imposes mandatory duties upon the Secretary of the Interior to collect information
from foreign governments on elephant conservation programs. 278 The Secretary must then make a determination as to
whether the United States will accept ivory from these countries.2 7 9 A complete moratorium on the importation of all
ivory may be more effective in saving the African elephant.
On the other hand, a complete ban may simply drive the
trade underground, where it will be more difficult to control.
Part II: Recommendations
All of the treaties, conventions, and acts discussed in this
article have certain flaws, however some flaws are far more
detrimental to the conservation of wildlife than others. One
major problem is that countries may attempt to protect particular species of wildlife without protecting the habitat
within which the species live. For example, the polar bear
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
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16
16
16
16
53
16
16

U.S.C. § 4221(b)(A)-(E) (1988); see also Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 132.
U.S.C. § 4222(b) (1988).
U.S.C. § 4223(1) (1988).
U.S.C. § 4223(3) (1988).
U.S.C. § 4223(5) (1988).
Fed. Reg. 52,243 (1988).
U.S.C. § 4221(a)-(b) (1988).
U.S.C. § 4222(a)(1) (1988).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/16

36

19891

INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE

would still be in danger of extinction even if all hunting was
stopped. The toxins and pollutants that have invaded the
bears' habitat, food supply, and body tissues may eventually
lead to the decimation of the entire population. 8 0 International wildlife laws must not only address the problem of illegal killing and trade, but must effectively combat pollution
and halt habitat destruction.
International wildlife laws should also impose strict liability on all parties who are involved in an illegal transaction. If
the ultimate recipient is forced not only to forfeit the object
purchased, but is also faced with a harsh fine or a prison sentence, fewer individuals will risk buying objects that are at all
suspect. A closely related recommendation is for greater education. All travelers should be given pamphlets warning them
of the illegality of wildlife trade in endangered species on the
planes, ships, or trains that carry them to foreign countries.
Shock value would work well here: pictures of slaughtered elephants and poached gorillas would certainly have a more lasting impact than a verbal warning. If tourists continue to buy
wildlife products, regardless of whether they are confiscated at
the border, more animals will be killed.
Dealers and poachers should be faced with mandatory jail
sentences and extremely harsh fines. Money collected from
these fines can be used to educate other people, and to create
effective wildlife conservation programs. The small fines that
are levied under current laws do little to put dealers out of
business. Furthermore, local people in developing countries
should be paid to show tourists live wildlife in natural habitats, or should be hired to form anti-poaching patrols. The desire for money is behind virtually every illegal wildlife transaction. If we can create monetary incentives to keep these
animals alive, the illegal trade in wildlife would decrease.
Domestic legislation such as the MMPA, ESA, Packwood
and Pelly Amendments, and National Environmental Policy
Act, should, where necessary, be extended to expressly include
jurisdiction over United States' interests and individuals oper280. See Kindt and Wintheiser, supra note 29, at 349.
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ating overseas. Jurisdiction and regulation of foreign businesses operating in United States' waters or trading in the
United States should also be extended to fully cover those operators. Commercial interests in the United States that avoid
regulation by, for example, reflagging fishing vessels under a
foreign registry, should not be able to use this subterfuge to
avoid compliance with domestic legislation. Moreover, where
enforcement restrictions exist to compel foreign compliance
with United States law, that enforcement should be pursued
vigorously.
It may also be possible to purchase vast tracts of land and
establish parks or reserves as common heritage resources.
Some natural resources, such as the water-recycling capabilities of the Brazilian rain forests, provide benefits that extend
far beyond national borders. If developed countries were to
purchase large tracts of this rain forest from the Brazilian
government, the Brazilians would be compensated for the
"loss" of the land (which they now use for timber and agricultural purposes). In exchange for their money, other countries
would ensure that the rain forests would remain intact and
thus continue to purify the world's fresh water supply. In this
scenario, the forest assumes the character of other common
heritage resources, and would be preserved as such for the
benefit of all.
International observer schemes, like those used by the
IWC, should be initiated at all ports of entry designated for
wildlife. Exporting countries should train officials in importing countries to recognize wildlife products that may be unfamiliar to importing officials. Governments should allow officials from other nations to randomly inspect shipments of
wildlife products, and to observe procedures used to monitor
these shipments. This may alleviate instances of bribery, sloppiness, and honest mistakes, and thus decrease the number of
illegal shipments that slip through the borders.
All ports of entry should have manuals describing wildlife
products in which trade is prohibited, and each manual
should be supplemented with confiscated examples of these
products (when possible). This manual should be uniform so
that all countries will have the same basis for deciding
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/16
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whether a product is being legally exported or imported. The
burden of proving that the importation or exportation of the
wildlife product is legal should be with the shipper, not with
the customs official.
Finally, treaties and conventions must be more strongly
drafted, imposing mandatory duties of preservation on the respective parties. Loopholes must be closed. For example, parties should make it difficult for an individual to qualify for an
exception to prohibitions on taking and trade. Citizen suit
provisions should be installed in all international wildlife
laws, allowing a party's own citizens to sue for violations of
the law. Wildlife injured by a country's actions should be
granted standing to sue in their own behalf.2 81 Furthermore,
international enforcement mechanisms should be developed to
allow one country to bring another country before an international tribunal for violations of the treaties or conventions.
Conclusion
The environment, as no other area can, demonstrates the
growing interdependency of life in the modern world. Clearly
we need to develop an environmental ethic that will allow us
as a world community, to address the interrelated nature of
the threat to global ecological survival. We proceed all too
often in haphazard fashion, developing one resource and preserving another without reference to any socio-economic-ethical-scientific foundation that will allow us to make rational
long-term decisions. In the area of wildlife preservation, the
most common mistake lies in seeking to protect specific
animal species without regard to the protection of the habitat
upon which those species depend for life. Individuals or private commercial interests often sacrifice long-term economic
stability for the false promise of short-term profits, while the
governments of the world appear to be more concerned with
281. C. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM
(1987). Building on his work in Should Trees Have Standing, 45 So. CAL. L. REV. 450
(1972), Professor Stone offers a comprehensive intellectual justification and practical
method for enabling natural objects to bring suit on their own behalf to redress
harms inflicted by the human community.
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protecting their abstract sovereignty rights than with preserving the viability of common resources that serve their people.
We must find ways of addressing the causes and effects of
wildlife loss, not merely the glaringly recognizable symptoms.
The carrying capacity of land-based ecosystems which provide
essential services such as flood control and water purification
as well as the productivity of the land for food crops is in serious jeopardy. Desertification, the widespread destruction of
the biological productivity of arid and semi-arid ecosystems
leading to an absence of perennial life and deforestation, primarily the destruction of tropical rain forests due to land
clearing for agriculture, timber exploitation, and charcoal production are two of the main causes and effects of the destruction of the global environment.2" 2 The World Commission on
Environment and Development estimates that six million
hectares of productive dryland are desertified each year, and
eleven million hectares of forests are cleared yearly.2 8 Hundreds of millions of hectares are threatened, principally in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Moreover, it is not merely
tropical forests and productive arid lands that are threatened
with destruction. Both the Arctic and Antarctic are under
pressure from mineral exploitation and other extractive
industries.2 84
Directly related to the destruction and loss of productive
land is the rapidly increasing loss of species diversity. The potential extinction of North American wolves, Florida panthers,
African rhinoceros, African elephants, California condors, the
American bald eagle, Montana's grizzly bear population, and
at least five species of whales, is cause for great alarm. It offends both our aesthetic and humanitarian senses. However,
there is greater cause for alarm in the potential loss of
thousands of other species of wildlife and plants unknown to
most of the world. Peter Raven, Director of the Missouri Bo282.
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tanical Garden, predicts that an average of one hundred species of wildlife and plants will be driven into extinction every
day for the next three decades - a rate one thousand times
the pace that has prevailed since prehistory.2 85 As Dr. Paul
Erlich writes in The Loss of Diversity: Causes and Consequences, "the primary cause of the accelerating loss of biological diversity is not direct exploitation or human malevolence,
but rather is attributed to the loss of habitat from expansion
of human population and activities. ' 2 6 He writes that the
most important anthropocentric reason for preserving diversity is the rate that microorganisms, animals, and plants play
in providing essential ecosystem services such as water purification, production of oxygen, etcetera. 8 7 Moreover, twentyfive percent of the pharmaceuticals in use today are originally
derived from plants, and new genetic transfer technology is
making possible significant advances in agriculture for improved yields, the use of non-toxic (natural) pesticides, and
alternative sources of paper.28 8 Particularly problematic is the
accelerating loss of the world's tropical forests, which while
covering a mere seven percent of the earth's surface, are home
to between fifty and eighty percent of the planet's species.2 89
Given the enormity and nature of the threat to the
world's wildlife population, we have not been able to address
in a comprehensive fashion potential solutions to the dilemma
of decreasing species diversity. The scope of our work has necessarily been limited to examining the United States' role in
international regulation and wildlife preservation efforts. We
plan to continue our work and hope that others will build
upon the effort.
We suggest that a concerted international effort, one in
which the United States by reason of fortunate advantage can
play a leadership role, is essential to preserving wildlife. Some
of our recommendations may seem drastic or inconceivable.
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However, our planet and its ability to support life is rapidly
reaching finite limits, and drastic measures may be needed to
assure continued development and survival. It is no longer
enough to allow countries to deal with their wildlife unilaterally. The nations of the world must unite to protect and preserve wildlife species that have survived human expansion
and exploitation so far. These species are our "common heritage." If effective, cooperative agreements and laws are not
enacted and enforced now, we may lose numerous animal species, including ourselves.
As we opened with a passage from a natural philosopher
of the eighteenth century, we will conclude this essay with a
passage from the work of a natural philosopher of the twentieth century:
We must search in our way of life, I think, for substantially more here than economic expansion and continued
good hunting. We need to look for a set of relationships
similar to the ones ... admired among the Eskimos. We
grasp what is beautiful in a flight of snow geese rising
against an overcast sky as easily as we grasp the beauty in
a cello suite; and intuit, I believe, that if we allow these
things to be destroyed or degraded for economic or frivolous reasons we will become deeply and strangely
impoverished.2 90
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